Dwight D. Eisenhower was a confident man, secure in the knowledge that his well-earned reputation as a military leader needed no promotion or protection on his part. Four years after the end of World War II, however, his sanguine attitude was shaken. The Army’s Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, had sent him a draft manuscript of the forthcoming official history of D-Day, “Cross-Channel Attack.”
Eisenhower, then president of Columbia, was startled by the author’s contention that after British and American leaders had decided on the invasion of North Africa as the initial ground operation against Germany in 1942, “all individuals involved regarded the possibility of a future cross channel operation as having been eliminated.” Eisenhower protested that neither he nor General George C. Marshall “ever abandoned for a single second” the idea that OVERLORD or its predecessor plan ROUNDUP would be “a major aspect” of Germany’s defeat (ltr. to Collins, Nov. 3, 1949).
Was it true? Had Ike ever wobbled when he was commanding Allied forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean in 1942-43? Certainly Winston Churchill had continuously and eloquently urged him toward ever greater efforts against what the British thought of as the “soft underbelly” of Hitler’s Europe.
Focused on the immediate task given him, Eisenhower may have been willing—or at least more willing than Marshall–to redirect resources that could have been used in Normandy in order to exploit successes in an admittedly non-decisive theater of operations. In January 1943 he had agreed with the “firm decision” to expand future operations against Axis forces in Italy because Allied weakness had made ROUNDUP impossible before the summer of 1944 (ltr. to Thomas T. Handy, Jan 28, 1943). Three months later he suggested “shifting our weight further eastward,” even as he assured Marshall “I personally have never wavered in my belief that the ROUNDUP conception is a correct one” (ltr. to Marshall, Apr. 19, 1943).
As Eisenhower was winding up his victory in Tunisia, he again wrote Marshall to advocate continuing efforts in the Mediterranean, even at the expense of the planned cross-channel thrust: “While I will always believe that the correct line is the straight, short and simple one, I have come to the conclusion that the old adage—’A poor plan vigorously carried out is better than a perfect plan indifferently executed’—applies in this case” (ltr. to Marshall, May 13, 1943). By September, as Italy was surrendering and the Allies were firming up plans for the Normandy invasion in 1944 (renamed OVERLORD), Eisenhower noted that Marshall was then slated to have the great command: “Our hearts are in that show and we only hope that we can do everything possible to increase its prospects for success” (ltr. to Marshall, Sept. 6, 1943).
Ironically, it was Ike, not Marshall, whom President Roosevelt selected to lead the mightiest of America’s wartime endeavors. In 1942-43, Eisenhower had spent a year gathering troops, equipment, and supplies, and then directing an Allied surge that would, ultimately (and under new leaders), end in northern Italy, well away from the locus of German power. It was not a wasted effort, however. Eisenhower’s Mediterranean campaign had given the American forces under his command valuable combat experience. It had also taught him how to lead a great multinational fighting force—an on-the-job education that would result in victory from D-Day until the final triumph over Germany.
Dr. Daun van Ee is an historian and editor for the Eisenhower Papers Project at Johns Hopkins University and a Trustee of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Society. The Eisenhower Society is dedicated to promoting the memory and legacy of leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower through educational programs, scholarships, grants, and special events. Learn more at dwightdeisenhowersociety.org.
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Society is dedicated to promoting the memory and legacy of leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower through educational programs, scholarships, grants, and special events.