January 1781 didn’t seem like a promising time for the U.S. Army in South Carolina. In the previous year, the army of 5000 men defending Charleston had surrendered and another army had basically been destroyed at the Battle of Camden. For a time, guerrilla forces commanded by Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion and a few others were the only resistance to the British and Loyalist forces commanded by Charles, Lord Cornwallis.
The British were increasingly focusing their efforts in the South, so Washington sent a new commander, Nathanael Greene, with the few troops he could spare, including a few Regulars and a small group of riflemen commanded by a rugged old Indian fighter, Daniel Morgan.
Greene decided to divide his tiny army, sending Morgan, two regiments of Regulars, along with LTC William Washington’s small troop of dragoons to the western part of the state to recruit new troops and “spirit up the countryside.”
Cornwallis sent his most aggressive – and brutal – commander, Banastre Tarleton, to run down Morgan. As Tarlton closed in, Morgan decided to stand and fight – at a grazing area known as Hannah’s Cowpens.
For the battle, Morgan came up with an innovative plan. Many of his small army were militia, short-term local recruits. Militia were not trusted; they were prone to run when facing a charge by Redcoats, which would open a dangerous hole in the line.
Morgan decided to use their strength. He knew they were not cowards and that many were armed with rifles, which were very accurate but slow to load and lacked a bayonet. He deployed them in two lines ahead of the main army. And he gave them permission to retreat, but only after getting off one or two rounds, instructing, “aim for the officers.”
Instead of retiring to his tent, Morgan spent the night going from campfire to campfire, joking with the soldiers, explaining what he expected them to do. One historian wrote, “Through all the history of American warfare, one cardinal principle has been sacred to the military: the American soldier is at his best when thoroughly briefed and totally conversant with what the overall objective is and what he is supposed to do. It is doubtful if any American troops ever went into a fight with a better knowledge of the battle plan than did Morgan’s troops at Cowpens.”
When Tarleton saw the American lines, he sent his troops straight ahead. The American sharpshooters did their jobs, firing their two shot and leaving many empty saddles, and then withdrew. Tarleton assumed the retreat was underway and committed his total force – before the battle had properly begun.
Just as they approached the main American line, they were hit by Washington’s cavalry; many Redcoats fell and Washington’s cavalry galloped away in pursuit of Tarleton’s cavalry. Tarleton’s infantry continued without cavalry support.
One American unit misunderstood its orders and began to withdraw. The rest of the Americans began to give way; the battle hung in the balance. Morgan ran ahead and selected a spot and on reaching it, the retreating troops turned and fired.
Simultaneously, Washington’s dragoons returned and slashed the rear of the Highlanders. And the militia from the first line returned to battle, striking them in flank.
Rarely has a battle unfolded so completely as planned by one of the contending generals. Tarleton’s force was destroyed: 100 killed, 500+ captured, compared to American losses, 12 killed, 62 wounded. An enraged Cornwallis chased the Americans into North Carolina, where he won a costly victory to which one member of Parliament reacted, “another such victory and our cause is undone.” Far from his supplies and with no plan, Cornwallis moved into Virginia, where, barely a year after the “complete” victory at Camden, he surrendered his army, in effect bringing an end to British colonial rule in America.
