Eisenhower and Oppenheimer

The recent hit movie “Oppenheimer” has many of the elements of a classic drama. It featured suspense, superlative acting, and a brilliant but conflicted hero: the physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, so-called “father of the atomic bomb.” Inevitably, there is also a two-faced, scheming villain: Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

One major player in the real-life story is largely notable by his absence: President Dwight David Eisenhower. In fact, it was Eisenhower, not Strauss, who interposed a “blank wall” between Oppenheimer and access to classified information after reports surfaced that the scientist had current and long-standing connections with Communists, and indeed might even be a Soviet secret agent. Oppenheimer unsuccessfully appealed for reinstatement to a special personnel security board, and Eisenhower approved the permanent cancellation of his security clearance.

Dr. Daun van Ee

Oppenheimer may have been brought down by his personal enemies, as the movie suggests, but Eisenhower was not one of them. The President recognized the physicist’s great accomplishments and abilities, and after World War II he welcomed his advice on the brand-new field of atomic warfare and the necessity for candor and openness when informing the American public about its dangers. In addition, he was not unsympathetic to Oppenheimer’s earlier opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb, a position that had played a large part in spurring the charges against him. In July 1945 General Eisenhower had been shocked and depressed to learn that the United States was planning to use the newly developed weapon of mass destruction against the all-but-defeated Japanese Empire. Just as this wartime expression of opinion was not used against him, so he felt that Oppenheimer’s concerns should not form any part of accusations of disloyalty.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower acted swiftly after his Secretary of Defense informed him of the charges. After instantly canceling Oppenheimer’s clearance, he directed his Attorney General to see whether criminal charges should be filed. (None were.) He took these steps even though Oppenheimer’s contacts with government officials were, by the end of 1953, minimal at best and in spite of the fact that the “vast bulk” of the facts behind the accusations had been “constantly reviewed and re-examined over a number of years, and that the over-all conclusion has always been that there is no evidence that implies disloyalty on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer” (Eisenhower to Herbert Brownell, Dec. 3, 1953).

So why did Ike take such drastic steps? To begin with, Eisenhower knew that even though Oppenheimer probably was completely loyal, he might still be a security risk, vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. Early in Ike’s first term the domestic and international situation made it politically problematic to entrust secrets to individuals with connections to the Communist Party. In June 1953 he had signed off on the execution of atomic spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. In August he had come the realization that the Soviets had developed their own hydrogen bomb and that the United States had lost its commanding lead in the nuclear arms race. In November, Attorney General Brownell had announced that the Truman Administration had knowingly permitted the appointment of a Communist agent (Harry Dexter White) to a high government post.

Furthermore, Eisenhower’s own political future, if not his presidency, was at risk as he headed toward a 1954 showdown with Wisconsin’s red-baiting Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy. Ten days after the Oppenheimer board began its proceedings, a Senate committee launched a nationally televised inquiry into McCarthy’s charges of Communist infiltration into the military—the Army-McCarthy hearings.

In the end, things worked out largely in Eisenhower’s favor. McCarthy was prevented from starting any independent (and, for Eisenhower, politically embarrassing) inquiry into Oppenheimer. The senator’s boorish and bullying behavior during the Army-McCarthy hearings paved the way toward the ruin of his political career. Many Americans could not help contrasting McCarthy’s reckless inquisitorial style with the Eisenhower Administration’s perceived respect for due process during the Oppenheimer matter.

The victory came at a cost. Many Democrats, as well as members of the scientific community, felt that Oppenheimer had been treated unfairly as a result of guilt-by-association and punishment for airing unpopular views.  While most of the opprobrium fell on Strauss’s shoulders, both he and President Eisenhower were to suffer the consequences in 1959, when Oppenheimer’s defenders mobilized to defeat Strauss’s nomination as Secretary of Commerce.

Dr. Daun van Ee is an historian and editor for the Eisenhower Papers Project at Johns Hopkins University and a Trustee of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Society. The Eisenhower Society is dedicated to promoting the memory and legacy of leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower through educational programs, scholarships, grants, and special events. Learn more at dwightdeisenhowersociety.org.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Society is dedicated to promoting the memory and legacy of leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower through educational programs, scholarships, grants, and special events.