Few people would argue that the Ayatollah was not a brutal dictator who repressed his people and supported terrorism. The people of Iran are undoubtedly better off without him.
Or are they?
To evaluate the long-term results, it is necessary to consider: (a) whether this will improve the lives of the Iranian people; (b) whether it will improve or worsen conditions in other Middle Eastern countries; and (c) from the U.S. perspective, whether we are better or worse off.
The casualness and carelessness of the U.S. operation are shocking. The Iraq War was planned for years and still became the worst foreign policy disaster in American history. This one was planned for months—by a former Fox News weekend host, two real estate developers, officer corps and intelligence services that have been repeatedly purged, and Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been yearning for war with Iran for 40 years.
So far, the cost is growing: six Americans killed, with more likely to come; several hundred Iranians killed; one school and several hospitals destroyed.
The last war the United States unambiguously won (the Persian Gulf War, 1992) was the only one waged in accordance with the principles of the Powell Doctrine, named for former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
The doctrine had six key tenets, all of which we have ignored:
- Vital Interests: Force should be used only to protect critical national security interests. Intelligence reports denied that Iran’s attainment of a nuclear weapon was imminent. The military has briefed that it had no information indicating nuclear capability was imminent.
- Last Resort: All other nonviolent diplomatic and economic options must be exhausted first. We did not exhaust any options. We have no meaningful allies, except Benjamin Netanyahu.
- Clear Objectives: The mission must have specific, achievable, and clearly understood goals. Instead, we have many contradictory goals: regime change; urging the Iranian people to rise up and change the regime themselves; willingness to do business with the regime; ending their nuclear program, described as an imminent threat; ending their missile program, also described as imminent; stopping their support of terrorism. Most recently, Secretary of State Rubio said—and Speaker Mike Johnson repeated—that we had to attack because we knew they would someday be attacked and would attack back.
- Overwhelming Force: When engaged, the military should use decisive, superior force to win quickly and minimize casualties. Instead, we are pursuing the same “bomb them into submission” strategy that has never succeeded.
- Exit Strategy: A clear plan for ending the conflict and withdrawing troops must exist before entering. “We’ll leave when we win” is not an exit strategy. The government has variously said the conflict will take two or three days, four to five weeks, or much longer. We’ll never put boots on the ground. We’ll put boots on the ground whenever we want.
- Public and Congressional Support: The action requires strong, sustained support from Congress and the American people. Unlike previous wars, the President has made no effort to explain, justify, or build support for this one. The American public, which typically supports wars initially and then grows disillusioned, has already shown its reluctance: only 27 percent support this war.
Apparently unconsidered are questions such as: What will we do if the Revolutionary Guard begins massacring the Iranian public? What happens if Iran disrupts traffic in the Strait of Hormuz? What will regional stability look like if Iran fractures into warring factions? What if it destroys its own oil production? What if Iranians react as Americans did after 9/11, with a nationwide “rally ’round the flag” response? What if they unleash their world-class assassination teams?
Beyond the implications for the Persian Gulf, there are additional concerns. This marks the second occasion in a few months that the United States has decapitated the leadership of a sovereign nation. In Venezuela, as in Iran, the U.S. offered multiple, often contradictory reasons: interdicting the fentanyl trade (by blowing up boats not headed to the U.S. and not carrying fentanyl); breaking up drug rings (while leaving organizers in place); regime change (though the regime, minus Maduro, remains); promoting democracy (while abandoning the opposition and showing no interest in elections); and oil, which appears to have been the real motive.
What is likely to happen next? Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a descendant of refugees from Castro’s Cuba, has made no secret of his desire to see the Castro regime removed from Cuba. President Trump may have dropped, for now, his claims regarding Greenland, but he has not renounced his interest in the Panama Canal. A move against either by an increasingly isolated and increasingly reckless United States cannot be ruled out.
This attack also occurred amid apparently promising negotiations, with a session already scheduled. What credibility will the next U.S. negotiating team have? Why would Cuba, Panama, or Denmark agree to talks?
The unspoken but very real “Trump Doctrine”—which seems to signal, “If you see what you want and have the strength, take it”—is likely to encourage Russian and Chinese territorial ambitions, and perhaps others as well.
There is almost no prospect that the Ayatollah will be replaced by something better. The most likely outcome is civil war among factions, followed either by a return to clerical rule or by secular rule under the Revolutionary Guard or another paramilitary force. Globally, the result is likely to be increased instability.
